I. INTRODUCTION
In the absence of national legislation tackling climate change in the United States, a new generation of tort-based lawsuits has arisen against corporate defendants, alleging that greenhouse gases emitted by such defendants have contributed to climate change that has caused real property damage to plaintiffs.
2 Most cases concerning liability for carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gas emissions have been unsuccessful in that they have not proceeded past the pleadings due to a lack of justiciability.
3 However, 417-18 (2006) (arguing that plaintiffs in such lawsuits will be unlikely to meet Article III justiciability requirements "on three different bases: 1) they will be unable to prove that the global warming resulting from the defendant's carbon dioxide emissions is the likely cause of their injury; 2) where they allege that the defendant's actions will cause a future injury, they will be unable to prove that the injury will occur imminently; and 3) they will fail to prove that carbon dioxide emissions of a particular entity caused their injuries."). See In Kivalina, the city of Kivalina-located on a small island off the coast of Alaska-sued several oil and power companies to recover $400 million, alleging in public nuisance claims that the companies "tortiously" contributed to the global warming that has severely eroded the island's shoreline, requiring its residents to be relocated. The district court dismissed Kivalina's claims on two grounds: 1) plaintiffs lack standing because their injuries are not "fairly traceable" to any of the defendants' alleged wrongdoing; and 2) because the issues raised by the complaint require a legislative, not a judicial, solution, the claims are barred by the political 
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arising from property damage caused by global warming and intentional greenhouse gas emissions. 6 Furthermore, plaintiffs are using innovative legal approaches in state courts that have the potential to succeed and open the doors of state courts to climate change related lawsuits as well. 7 Emitters of greenhouse gases externalize the true social and environmental costs of their contribution to climate change onto the public. 8 Efforts to recover these costs, which manifest both through the costs of impacts and the costs of efforts to prevent impacts, can take the form of insurance claims as well as legal remedies. 9 Liability insurance providers have a general duty to defend those they insure, in addition to their responsibility to indemnify the insured for damages incurred by third parties. 10 The duty to defend and the duty to indemnify the insured are based upon the Commercial General Liability (CGL) policy held by the insured.
11
Unsurprisingly, parties insured by CGL policies argue that liabilities related to carbon dioxide emissions are covered under the policies. 12 However, insurers insist that this type of liability falls under the "pollution exclusion" of CGL policies. 13 As a result of the exclusion, the insurers argue they are not required to defend or indemnify the insured for third party damages associated with intentional carbon dioxide and greenhouse gas emissions. 14 With the potential influx of climate change lawsuits inundating the United States court system, the question of whether CGL policies cover liabilities created by property damage resulting from global warming needs resolution. In April 2012, the Virginia Supreme Court held in AES Corp. v. Steadfast Insurance Co. (AES v. Steadfast) that liability insurance companies do not have a duty to defend the insured in climate change related damage claims resulting from the insured's intentional release of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases. 15 The court reasoned that potential liabilities arising from the insured's intentional emissions are not covered by CGL policies 6 See Paul 19 The village of Kivalina sought compensation from the defendants for climate change related destruction of its land through the federal common law of public nuisance. 20 In its complaint, Kivalina alleged the defendants' emission of millions of tons of carbon dioxide "intentionally or negligently" created a nuisance, in the form of global warming. 21 The complaint stated that AES's emissions "caus[ed] land-fast sea ice protecting the village's shoreline to form later or melt earlier in the annual cycle" and "exposed the shoreline to storm surges, resulting in erosion of the shoreline and rendering the village uninhabitable." 22 The complaint further asserted that AES "knew or should have known" that its activities would result in the alleged harm. 
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alleged that the damage to the village was so extreme that the inhabitants of the village were required to relocate.
24
In response to Kivalina's allegations, AES turned to its insurance policy and insisted that its provider, Steadfast Insurance Company (Steadfast), had a duty to defend the company from potential liability. 25 AES purchased liability insurance from Steadfast and held a CGL policy at the time of the suit. 26 In the CGL policies at issue, Steadfast had a duty to defend AES against lawsuits seeking damages resulting from bodily injury or property damage caused by an "occurrence." 27 Steadfast denied coverage and thereafter filed a declaratory judgment action in the Circuit Court of Arlington County in Virginia, the jurisdiction in which AES is headquartered. 28 Steadfast denied coverage based on three grounds: 1) the Kivalina complaint did not allege "property damage" caused by an "occurrence" as the policies defined "occurrence"; 29 2) the alleged injuries arose before Steadfast's coverage incepted; and 3) the greenhouse gas emissions alleged in Kivalina were "pollutants," excluded from coverage by virtue of the policies' pollution exclusion.
30
On cross-motions for summary judgment, Steadfast argued, among other things, that the Kivalina complaint did not allege property damage caused by an occurrence because the complaint asserted that AES "knew or should have known" that its intentional activities would lead to global warming that damaged the village. 31 An "occurrence" is defined in the policies as "an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful condition." 32 AES argued that any alleged harm resulting from climate change must be considered an "accident" because it was unintended or unexpected, as acknowledged by the "knew or should know" language in the Kivalina complaint, despite that the policies do not define "accident." 33 The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Steadfast, finding it had no duty to defend AES because To fully understand the Virginia Supreme Court's decision in AES v. Steadfast, it is important to be familiar with insurance companies' duty to defend, the CGL "pollution exclusion" policy, and the Supreme Court's decision in Massachusetts v. EPA. This Part addresses these three topics before further discussing the AES v. Steadfast decision.
The Duty to Defend
In addition to their duty to indemnify the insured, insurance companies have a duty to defend the insured from third party liabilities that come within the scope of the CGL policy. 37 The duty to defend requires insurance companies to "indemnify until it becomes clear that there can be no recovery" under the CGL policy. 38 To fulfill its duty to defend, the insurer must enlist legal counsel to represent the insured and must also pay the legal fees and costs sustained in litigation on behalf of the insured. 39 Furthermore, if the insurer disputes its duty to defend and loses, the insurer may also be required to pay "the cost incurred by the insured . . . in establishing the insurer's duty to defend." 40 Accordingly, if the court found Steadfast had a duty to defend AES in its lawsuit with Kivalina, Steadfast could be responsible for paying all of AES's defense costs, as well as the litigation costs and attorney's fees AES incurred in determining whether Steadfast had a duty to defend. 41 The insurer's duty to defend the insured is related to, but broader than, the insurer's duty to indemnify the insured. 42 
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"potentially covered [by the CGL policy] the insurer has to fund the insured's defense against the third party's claim." 43 Furthermore, even if the claim against the insured is not proven, the insurance company bears the cost of the defense and is not permitted to seek reimbursement. 44 Courts "impose an immediate defense obligation" on the insurer once the insured shows there is "potential for coverage." 45 In all circumstances, the statements made in the complaint(s) filed against the insured determine whether or not an insurer has a duty to defend. 46 Generally, an insurance company's duty to defend "is excused only when a complaint unambiguously excludes coverage under the policy." 47 Therefore, if a third party claim is conceivably covered by the policy, the insurance company's duty to defend stands. 48 Furthermore, the duty to defend is not extinguished even if allegations in a complaint are "groundless, false, or fraudulent." 49 The insurance company is excused of its duty to defend the insured only when the complaint against the insured does not advance any allegations that would be covered under the CGL policy. 50 In summary, an insurer must defend the insured when the insurer may be required to indemnify the insured under the CGL policy. 51 Furthermore, all allegations in the third party's complaint do not need to fall within the scope of the insured's policy to trigger the insurer's duty to defend. 52 If one of the allegations made by the third party falls within the scope of the insured's CGL policy, then the duty to defend is triggered. 53 The insurer must also pay all litigation fees associated with the lawsuit even if most of the allegations in the complaint fall outside the scope of the CGL policy. 54 Nevertheless, when litigation is finished, "the insurer is entitled to seek reimbursement at the conclusion of the litigation if the insurer can show that certain fees and expenses are solely allocable to uncovered causes of action." 55 
Pollution Exclusion for CGL Policies
Another issue underlying the AES decision is the environmental "pollution exclusion" for CGL policies. 57 In 1980, Congress cracked down on pollution by passing the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA). 58 CERCLA "regulates the cleanup of existing, inactive, and abandoned hazardous waste disposal sites" 59 and was enacted as a solution to widespread industrial pollution. 60 In response to CERCLA, insurance companies tried to limit the coverage of their CGL policies in order to exclude coverage for liabilities related to intentional pollution on the part of the insured.
61
CERCLA states that "any person 62 who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of . . . shall be liable for all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States Government or a State."
63
Because CERCLA applied ex post facto, "businesses which generated, treated, or disposed of toxic chemicals suddenly found themselves liable for tremendous cleanup costs from past activities, even if such activities were entirely legal at the time." 64 Consequently, insurance companies providing coverage to polluters under CGL policies were also confronted with unexpected liability. 65 Insurance companies "fought to deny pollution coverage" for CGL policies out of fear that they would be obligated to indemnify the insured for tremendous liabilities under CERCLA. 66 However, the battle for court recognition of the "pollution exclusion" was not easy and insurers were initially required to indemnify CGL policyholders from the enormous, unanticipated liabilities created by CERCLA. 67 Before CERCLA, CGL policies were known as Comprehensive General Liability policies. 68 The use of the term "comprehensive" gave the insured the impression that the policy 57 See Paul, supra note 3, at 480, 485.
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covered all third party liabilities. 69 However, insurance companies intended for CGL policies to cover "accidents" and denied coverage to policyholders when they caused intentional harm. 70 Insurance companies attempted to clarify CGL policy coverage with the courts and insured parties by drafting the pollution exclusion. 71 Insurers drafted the pollution exclusion so it would apply when policyholders intentionally polluted, even if the policyholders did not intend to harm a third party. 72 Nevertheless, courts were reluctant to acknowledge the pollution exclusion because the insured parties understood the CGL policies to be comprehensive. 73 Court interpretations of the attempted pollution exclusion were inconsistent across the United States.
74
In response to the judicial inconsistency with respect to the CGL policy's pollution exclusion of liability related to intentional releases, the insurance industry attempted to clarify its intent by changing the coverage in CGL policies from "accident" based to "occurrence" based. 75 The new occurrence based policy was intended to further clarify the pollution exclusions under the CGL policies by limiting coverage to accidents that took place within a limited time window, thereby excluding coverage for the insured if it polluted over a period of time. 76 The exclusion required pollution to be "sudden and accidental" for it to be covered under CGL policies. 77 Moreover, insurance companies changed the name of such policies to Commercial General Liability policies to clarify that the policy was not comprehensive. However, even with the clarifications, some courts continued to decide in favor of the insured.
78
Insurance companies oftentimes contend that their absolute pollution exclusion is clear and unambiguous and must be read literally. 79 Courts generally have favored the insurance companies' position in cases involving traditional environmental pollution. 80 Other courts have adopted this 69 Id. 70 Id. at 480. 71 Id. 72 Id. at 481. 73 See id. at 481-83. 74 position for other types of underlying claims as well. 81 The efforts of the insurance companies eventually were sufficient to persuade state courts to recognize the pollution exclusion, and CGL policies were no longer held to cover damages caused by intentional pollution. 82 However, the momentum underlying this juridical interpretation has begun to slowly deviate toward judicial adoption of policyholders' narrow interpretation of the pollution exclusion. 83 Further information on this juridical change will be addressed in Part II to support policyholders' contentions that the insurance company's interpretation of policy language ignores the familiar and reasonable connotations of the words used, and sometimes defined, in the pollution exclusion. 89 Although the cause of global warming was widely accepted to be an increase of carbon dioxide levels in the atmosphere, EPA had difficulty classifying carbon dioxide as a pollutant because it is different from other pollutants and greenhouse gases. 90 Unlike other pollutants and greenhouse gases whose optimal level in the atmosphere is zero, the optimal level of carbon dioxide is not zero because the earth requires a certain level of it in the atmosphere. In AES v. Steadfast, the Virginia Supreme Court based its decision on the language of the CGL policy between AES and Steadfast, as is the rule when deciding whether an insurer has a duty to defend. 95 To determine if the insurer has a duty to defend on behalf of the insured, the court will look at "only the allegations in the complaint and the provisions of the insurance policy." 96 The CGL policies in question required Steadfast "to defend AES against suits claiming damages for bodily injury or property damage, if such 98 Therefore, to decide whether Steadfast had a duty to defend AES in its lawsuit with Kivalina, the court needed to determine whether AES's liability arose from an "occurrence" within the meaning of the CGL policies AES purchased from Steadfast. 99 If such an occurrence were found, Steadfast would have a duty to defend AES in the underlying case.
The Kivalina complaint contended "AES engaged in energy-generating activities using fossil fuels that emit carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases, and that the emissions contributed to global warming, causing" damage to the village's shoreline.
100 AES argued that the damage was accidental and met the definition of an "occurrence" under its CGL policies. 101 In furtherance of its point, AES maintained that because one of the allegations in Kivalina's complaint was "that the consequences of AES's intentional carbon dioxide and greenhouse gas emissions were unintended," the damage was "accidental" and fell within the scope of "occurrence" in its CGL policies purchased from Steadfast. 102 However, AES did not assert that Kivalina's other allegation, "that AES 'knew or should know' that its activities in generating electricity would result in the environmental harm suffered by Kivalina," created a duty to defend on the part of Steadfast.
103
Nevertheless, Steadfast would be required to defend the entire suit up front if even one allegation came within the scope of the CGL policy because of the requirements of a duty to defend, as described in Part II.B.1.
104
On the other hand, Steadfast argued that AES's emissions were not accidental and did not meet the definition of an "occurrence" under the CGL policies.
105 Steadfast claimed that even if AES did not intend to harm the village of Kivalina, AES did intend to emit carbon dioxide and greenhouse gases into the atmosphere, causing both of Kivalina's allegations in the complaint to fall outside the scope of "occurrence" under the CGL policies purchased by AES.
106
The Virginia Supreme Court agreed with Steadfast: Because AES intentionally emitted carbon dioxide, all of the complaint's allegations of harm fell outside the definition of "occurrence" in the CGL policy. 107 The 97 Id. at 534. 98 Id. at 536. 99 Id. 100 Id. at 534. 101 Id. at 537. 102 Id. 103 See id. at 536-37. 104 See CORNBLUM, supra note 10, § P67:2.1 (explaining that insurers with a duty to defend imposed as a matter of public policy must front legal expenses, as long as one claim is potentially covered).
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court further reasoned that even if the consequences were accidental or unintended by AES, they were not "natural and probable." 109 This Part addresses these arguments in the following order: 1) the decision does not take into account the reasonable expectations of the insured; 2) the decision does not construe the ambiguities of the CGL policy in favor of the insured; and 3) the decision does not consider the possibility that a duty to defend would cause insurers to regulate the behavior of the insured and reduce carbon dioxide and greenhouse gas emissions.
A. Reasonable Expectations of the Insured
One argument for deciding AES v. Steadfast in favor of AES and finding that Steadfast had a duty to defend is the "reasonable expectations of the insured" doctrine. 110 This doctrine "authorizes a court confronted with an adhesion contract to enforce the reasonable expectations of the parties under certain circumstances."
111 Policyholders contend that the insurance companies' interpretation of policy language ignores the familiar and reasonable connotations of the words used, and sometimes defined, in the pollution exclusion. 112 Policyholders also contend that the policy language is ambiguous and, therefore, according to the rules of insurance policy construction, must be interpreted in favor of coverage. 113 108 Id. 109 See, e.g., AES, 725 S.E.2d at 535-36 (noting the primacy of the insurance contract in the duty to defend context, and introducing the insurance liability concept of the reasonable expectations of the insured). 110 See Paul 112 See Park, supra note 111, at 171-73 (noting academic and judicial criticism of the highly technical "incomprehensible verbosity" of standard form insurance contracts (internal citation omitted)). The doctrine can be broad and courts have used it in the following three ways: "(i) [to construct] an ambiguous term in the insurance contract to satisfy the insured's reasonable expectations; (ii) [to refuse to enforce] the 'fine print' of an insurance contract because it limits more prominent provisions giving rise to the insured's expectations; and (iii) [to refuse to enforce] an insurance contract provision when it would frustrate the reasonable expectations of coverage created by the insurer outside of the contract." 114 The first and third reasons are applicable to the decision in AES v. Steadfast and the second is outside the scope of the case at hand.
If the reasonable expectations of the insured doctrine were applied to AES v. Steadfast, Steadfast might have a duty to defend AES in its lawsuit with Kivalina. The pollution exclusion of the CGL policy at issue did not specifically state that carbon dioxide and greenhouse gases were pollutants and, consequently, there is ambiguity with regard to whether the substances are pollutants excluded from coverage. 115 Under this doctrine, the ambiguity should have been construed in favor of AES. Therefore, the Virginia Supreme Court might have wrongly determined Steadfast did not have a exclusion and observed that "[o]ur review of the history of the pollution exclusion amply demonstrates that the predominate motivation in drafting an exclusion for pollution-related injuries was the avoidance of the enormous expense and exposure resulting from the 'explosion' of environmental litigation." Id. at 81. (internal quotation marks omitted). The court went on to note: "Similarly, the 1986 amendment to the exclusion was wrought, not to broaden the provision's scope beyond its original purpose of excluding coverage for environmental pollution, but rather to remove the 'sudden and accidental' exception to coverage which . . . resulted in a costly onslaught of litigation." Id. The court further stated: "We would be remiss, therefore, if we were to simply look to the bare words of the exclusion, ignore its raison d'etre, and apply it to situations which do not remotely resemble traditional environmental contamination." Id. The Koloms court also rejected the insurance company's argument that its deletion of language regarding the discharge of pollutants "into or upon land, the atmosphere, or any watercourse or body of water" broadened the scope of the exclusion, and concluded that, "the deletion of the aforementioned language does not portend an expansion of the pollution exclusion beyond the context of traditional environmental contamination." Id. at 81-
82.
In Lititz, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that the pollution exclusion was ambiguous and did not bar coverage for an underlying lead paint poisoning claim. Lititz, 785 A.2d at 982. The court determined that the definition of a "pollutant" in the exclusion encompassed lead-based paint, but that the "process by which lead-based paint becomes available for human ingestion/inhalation," did not unambiguously involve "a type of motion that can be characterized as a discharge, dispersal, release or escape," as required by the policy language. Id. at 981. The court stated: "One would not ordinarily describe the continual, imperceptible, and inevitable deterioration of paint that has been applied to the interior surface of a residence as a discharge ('a flowing or issuing out'), a release ('the act or an instance of liberating or freeing'), or an escape ('an act or instance of escaping'). Arguably such deterioration could be understood to constitute a 'dispersal,' the definition of which ('the process . . . of . . . spreading . . . from one place to another') may imply a gradualism not characteristic of other terms. Any such inconsistency in meaning simply indicates, however, that the exclusionary language does not clearly include or exclude the physical process here at issue, but is, as to that process, ambiguous. Such ambiguity requires that the language be interpreted in favor of the insured." Id. at 982 (citations and footnotes omitted). 114 Another argument against the AES v. Steadfast decision is that the pollution exclusion is ambiguous as to whether carbon dioxide is a pollutant and the ambiguity should be resolved in favor of the insured. 117 It is well established in insurance policy litigation that ambiguities are resolved in favor of policyholders because insurance companies are responsible for drafting the policies and are in a better position to prevent any ambiguity. 118 Therefore, any event in which CGL policy coverage is questionable should be covered by the policy because it is ambiguous. 119 As one commentator put it: "even if courts choose to honor the [pollution] exclusion, however, they should recognize that the phrase 'sudden and accidental' is susceptible to varying interpretations and is inherently ambiguous."
120
If this reasoning alone were applied in AES v. Steadfast, then Steadfast might have had a duty to defend AES in its potential liability to Kivalina, because the CGL policy did not specifically address third party liabilities connected to intentional carbon dioxide emissions. 121 The Virginia Supreme Court could have decided that the pollution exclusion was ambiguous in that it did not specifically enumerate which pollutants were covered under the exclusion. This way, Kivalina's allegation that if AES unintentionally harmed the village by intentionally emitting carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases into the atmosphere would have come within the scope of the policy and triggered Steadfast's duty to defend.
C. Insurance Companies Can Regulate Behavior
A third argument against the court's decision in AES v. Steadfast, and in favor of finding a duty to defend, is that insurance companies should be liable in global warming related suits because it will create a system of 116 123 If insurance companies were required to bear the large cost of climate change related damages, they would have an incentive to grant CGL policies only to responsible emitters. 124 As a result, many companies would need to change their business practices regarding emissions to obtain liability insurance, thereby incentivizing emissions reduction programs in the United States.
125
Congress has never regulated carbon dioxide, and there is currently no discussion of legislation addressing climate change mitigation and carbon dioxide emissions reductions at the federal level. 126 Furthermore, Congress has not contemplated any comprehensive greenhouse gas emissions regulation since 2008 when the Senate debated the Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act, which proposed a nationwide cap and trade program for the United States.
127 For this reason, some legal scholars see insurance companies as a possible way-or maybe the only way-to reduce carbon dioxide and greenhouse gas emissions across the United States.
128 If the Virginia Supreme Court decided AES v. Steadfast in favor of AES, then insurance companies would need to respond by reducing their exposure to liability. 129 This response would result in stricter regulation of policyholders with regard to their carbon dioxide and greenhouse gas emissions, creating a private system of behavior regulation that is ideal in the absence of federal action. 
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IV. ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF A DUTY TO DEFEND ARE INADEQUATE
The arguments in favor of imposing a duty to defend in lawsuits that allege property damage from intentional emissions of carbon dioxide and greenhouse gases are inadequate. This Part presents counterarguments to the arguments proposed in the previous section in their respective order.
A. Reasonable Expectations of the Insured
The reasonable expectation of the insured argument does not hold up in AES v. Steadfast. The pollution exclusion has existed for several decades and has been consistently recognized in courts since the late 1980s. 131 Additionally, "[w]here the policyholder does not suffer from lack of legal sophistication or a relative lack of bargaining power, and where it is clear that an insurance policy was actually negotiated and jointly drafted, [a court] need not go so far in protecting the insured from ambiguous or highly technical drafting."
132 AES is a sophisticated actor and likely understood the terms of its CGL policy and its exclusions. 133 This sophistication makes it extremely unlikely that AES reasonably believed its potential liability in Kivalina would come within the coverage limitations of its CGL policy. 134 It is more likely that AES acted in bad faith in demanding that Steadfast defend the company against its possible emissions related liability.
135
Before purchasing the policy from Steadfast, AES should have clarified whether liabilities from its emissions were covered by the CGL policy, because AES at least had reason to doubt whether Steadfast would indemnify emissions related liabilities. Companies purchasing CGL policies have an opportunity to contract around the general provisions in order to meet each company's specific needs.
136 Therefore, AES should have made certain the CGL policy indemnified the company from liabilities related to its emissions because the company was a sophisticated actor and may have had the ability to influence the policy provisions. The argument that the pollution exclusion is ambiguous as to whether carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases are pollutants is also insufficient to merit a decision in favor of the insured. By not specifically listing carbon dioxide liabilities as exclusions in its CGL policies, Steadfast was not ambiguous or misleading in drafting its CGL policy exclusions. 138 Rather, Steadfast did not list carbon dioxide as a specific pollutant because it intended the exclusion to encompass all pollutants. 139 If insurance companies were required to list each specific scenario in CGL policy exclusions to successfully avoid indemnifying the insured, it would be impossible for insurance companies to exclude unanticipated liabilities like those created under CERCLA. 140 Therefore, in addition to the language contained in the policy, it is important to look at the intention of the insurance company in drafting the exclusions.
141
The language in the pollution exclusion of CGL policies references the intent of the insurer to exclude itself from all third party claims arising from the intentional release of pollutants. 142 The pollution exclusion of AES's CGL policy clearly stated that coverage was limited to pollution or contamination injuries when the pollution or contamination is caused by the "sudden and accidental" discharge of pollutants or contaminants. 143 Insurers use broad language in the exclusion not to be ambiguous, but to ensure that they will avoid liability for all pollution, including pollution liabilities that were unforeseeable at the time the policy was drafted. 144 The language in the CGL policy pollution exclusion indicates that insurers intended to renounce all potential liabilities from intentional pollution and it is all encompassing, not ambiguous.
C. Insurance Companies Can Regulate Behavior
The argument that insurers can regulate behavior is also insufficient to merit a duty to defend on the part of Steadfast. Insurance companies can be used to regulate the behavior of private emitters; however, the insurers should not be able to regulate retroactively. Climate change tort suits are 138 See Pa. Dep't of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 212 (3d Cir. 1998) (standing for the proposition that failing to explicitly enumerate the ways in which a document applies does not necessarily "demonstrate ambiguity."). 139 See AES, 725 S.E.2d at 533 (implying that Steadfast intended the pollution exclusion to include releases of carbon dioxide). 140 See Paul, supra note 3, at 485, 498 (stating that the 1987 exclusions adopted by the insurance industry were created to prevent courts from holding insurance companies liable for "continuous or gradual pollution," including emissions of carbon dioxide, and to protect the insurance companies from being held liable under CERCLA). 141 See id. at 481-82. 142 based on CGL policies already in existence. 146 The parties of the contract agreed to certain terms, and the insurer cannot change the provisions of the policy and impose certain behavior requirements where there were none before. 147 If an insurance company changed the terms of a contract that it already bargained for, such change becomes a unilateral contract modification.
148 Unilateral contract modifications are strictly prohibited in contract law. 149 Consequently, it would be acceptable for insurers to regulate behavior with future policies that required insured parties to adhere to certain emissions standards, but insurers could not force their current policyholders to agree to anything more than the provisions contained in the CGL policy. 154 it is unlikely that the Supreme Court intended a limited application of its holding. 155 In Massachusetts v. EPA, the Supreme Court determined that "the broad language of [the Clean Air Act] reflects an intentional effort to confer the flexibility necessary to forestall such obsolescence." 156 The Court further cited itself in a previous case stating that "[t]he fact that a statute can be 'applied in situations not expressly anticipated by Congress does not demonstrate ambiguity. It demonstrates breadth. '" 157 This logic is consistent with the insurer's logic in drafting the pollution exclusion to cover a broad array of possible pollutants. 158 
B. The Insured is Facing a Known Risk
Furthermore, in AES v. Steadfast, the Virginia Supreme Court's decision was correct because it places the cost of damages on the party best able to control the risk. 159 Climate change and its damages are widely known. 160 Moreover, the fact that increasing carbon dioxide emissions are the cause of global climate change is well established. 161 Therefore, companies reasonably should know that their actions to increase levels of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere contribute to global warming and the resultant property damage.
162
Companies like AES that emit significant amounts of carbon dioxide and greenhouse gases should bear the cost of damages caused by climate change because they knew, or should have known, that emissions would contribute to global climate change. 163 Because of their knowledge, companies in AES's position have the best ability to control the risk of being liable for climate change damages. 164 Companies might argue that the effects of carbon dioxide and greenhouse gases on the environment are a new development in science and that the CGL policies should cover damages associated with intentional emissions for this reason. However, this argument does not stand, because emitters should have been aware of global climate change when they purchased their CGL policies as these policies are generally renewed on a year-to-year basis. 165 Moreover, some legal scholars argue that insurers should bear the cost of climate change damages because tremendous amounts of liability would be detrimental to emitters. 166 However, this is not the case because both insurers and emitters are equally able to bear the costs of climate change damages. 167 Even arguing that it is not worse for emitters than it would be for insurers, it is still detrimental for both parties. Emitters would not have insurance at all if the liability were not detrimental to them. Just because they are capable of covering the potential liability with their profit margins does not mean it would not leave them worse off. In this case, it may simply be a matter of which actor society chooses to place the burden upon. Although one may argue that energy prices may increase if companies are liable for these damages, it is important to consider that prices may increase regardless of the party incurring the additional costs. Thus, the difference might not be substantial. If emitters are liable for the damages, this increase ENVIRONMENTAL LAW [Vol. 44:201 in operating costs may force emitters to raise prices. 168 If insurers are liable, they may raise the emitting company's insurance premiums, which emitters may, in turn, pass to consumers.
C. No Unanticipated or Unfair Burden on Insurance Companies
Insurance companies did not intend to cover liabilities from suits related to climate change. 169 This intent on the part of the insurance companies is referenced in the wording of CGL policies and their exclusions. 170 The revisions of the pollution exclusion and the affidavits submitted to the insurance commissioner show that insurers tried to make this intent clear in the policies and did not intend to mislead the insured.
171
Insurers even changed the name of the liability insurance policies they offered from "Comprehensive General Liability" to "Commercial General Liability." 172 If courts determine that liability insurers have a duty to defend in cases with third party liabilities associated with climate change, it would be unfair because the insurers took great efforts to disclaim this type of liability. 173 Furthermore, insurance companies can only bear significant amounts of risk when they have prepared for that risk. 174 Forcing insurance companies to bear the cost of climate change when they did not anticipate the liability would be detrimental to the liability insurance industry and would cause undesirable outcomes, such as increased premiums and reductions in coverage. 175 Moreover, in addition to the increased premiums due to the costs of compensating third parties for damage related to climate change, insurance prices would also need to increase to cover for the costs incurred defending unanticipated lawsuits. 169 See Paul, supra note 3, at 479-84 ("Insurers and courts had widely understood this requirement to mean that insurers would not cover risks voluntarily assumed by the insured, nor risks the insured knowingly or intentionally incurred."). 170 Id.
171 Until the mid-1980s, the standard commercial general liability form was called the "Comprehensive General Liability" coverage. The word "comprehensive" turned out to be a problem because the policyholders claimed the term indicated "broad" or "full" coverage. Various courts of law, agreeing that this term was less than crystal clear, sided with the policyholders and held the insurance companies to cover many claims which were not intended to be included in the policy. Thus, around 1984 the standard policy form was renamed to "Commercial General Liability coverage." 172 R. Stephen Burke, Pollution Exclusion Clauses-The Agony, the Ecstasy, and the Irony for Insurance Companies, 17 N. KY. L. REV. 443, 443-44 (1990) . 173 If liability insurers were required to indemnify the insured for liabilities related to its intentional emissions, Congress would have less of an incentive to take steps forward with national regulation of carbon dioxide and greenhouse gas emissions because the injured would be compensated through the court system. This method of compensating for damages caused by climate change is undesirable because regulation through the insurance industry and the court system would likely be significantly less effective than any comprehensive regulation by the federal government.
177
As a result, plaintiffs alleging climate change related damages would see state courts as the most likely place for recovery. 178 The consequences of climate change litigation occurring in state court include inconsistent laws throughout the country regarding carbon dioxide emissions. 179 This outcome is extremely undesirable and would make it difficult for companies operating in multiple states to comply with the law. 180 Comprehensive federal legislation would be a more effective and straightforward approach to regulating carbon dioxide and greenhouse gas emissions; the holding in AES v. Steadfast does not hinder a federal initiative because it does not allow compensation through the court system. 
